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Barry T. Hirsch 
Edward J. Schumacher 
ABSTRACT 
Studies uniformly conclude that union wage effects are largest for work­
ers with low measured skills. Longitudinal analysis using 1989190-
1994195 Current Population Survey matched panels produces union pre­
mium estimates equivalent across skill groups, following appropriate sam­
ple restrictions and control for worker-specific skills. Evidence from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth on aptitude scores confirms that 
union workers with high measured skills have relatively low unmeasured 
skills. Differential selection by skill class and skill homogeneity in union 
workplaces results from employer and employee sorting in response to 
wage standardization, union organizing where skills are homogeneous, 
and unionized employers' reluctance to hire the most as well as least able 
workers. 
I. Introduction 
The relationship between unionism, wages, and worker skills has 
been the focus of considerable research. A universal finding is that union-nonunion 
wage differentials are larger for lower-skilled than for higher-skilled workers.1 The 
standard explanation for this result is that unions standardize wages by decreasing 
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I. See, for example, Johnson and Youmans (1971) and Ashenfelter (1978). Lewis provides a survey, 
concluding that union wage gaps decrease with occupational skill level and schooling (Lewis 1986, pp. 
128-31, 136-39). As discussed subsequently, Card (1996) arrives at a similar conclusion using longitudinal 
analysis. 
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differentials across and within job positions (Freeman 1980) so that lower-skilled 
workers receive a larger premium relative to their alternative nonunion wage. There 
exists a related literature on omitted ability bias and the estimation of union wage 
effects. The conventional argument is that a wage premium encourages skill upgrad­
ing by unionized employers, so that standard OLS estimates of the premium are 
biased upward owing to a failure to account fully for worker skills positively corre­
lated with union status. 
In this paper, we argue that union wage effects need not lead to skill upgrading or 
to uniformly higher (or lower) unmeasured skills among union than among nonunion 
workers. Rather, the principal outcome associated with unionization is lower disper­
sion in worker skills in union than in nonunion workplaces. Selection by employers 
and employees leads union workers with low credentials or levels of measured skills 
to have high unmeasured ability, and those with high credentials or measured skills 
to have low unmeasured ability, relative to their nonunion counterparts. In contrast to 
standard cross-sectional estimates of union wage effects, our longitudinal estimates 
controlling for otherwise unmeasured worker-specific skills differ little with respect 
to the level of measured premarket skill. 
In the next section we develop the key arguments underlying the analysis. In 
Section III, we describe our data and empirical approach, and examine the impact 
of sample restrictions on premium estimates. Cross-sectional and longitudinal evi­
dence on union wage effects across skill groups is presented in Section IV. In Section 
V we examine direct evidence on differences between union and nonunion workers 
in aptitude scores. 
II. Skill Homogeneity, Unmeasured Skill, and Union 
Premium Estimates 
We use the term "unmeasured" to refer to worker skills that are 
observable to employers and productive in the workplace, but not observable or 
measured directly by researchers. Biased estimates of the union premium arise where 
unmeasured (omitted) skills are correlated with union status and the wage. Potential 
ability bias has led researchers to estimate union wage effects using selectivity meth­
ods (for example, Robinson 1989) or longitudinal models that control for unmeasured 
worker-specific skills (Mellow 1981; Freeman 1984; Robinson 1989; Jakubson 1991; 
Lemieux 1993; Card 1996). The conventional view is that the existence of a union 
premium leads to skill upgrading as employers select high-ability workers from the 
union queue. As a result, standard premium estimates are biased upward. Economists 
surveying the literature on union wage effects have emphasized this point (Lewis 
1986, pp. 46-47, 60-61; Hirsch and Addison 1986, pp. 116-17, 127-29; Booth 
1995, pp. 171-72). Recently, Wessels (1994) has argued rather convincingly that 
the conventional view may be wrong. He shows that a wage premium can decrease, 
increase, or leave unchanged worker skills. Given union bargaining power, an em­
ployer that upgrades worker skills through selective hiring would then face an even 
higher wage in the following bargaining round. Quoting Wessels: "[The standard 
story] assumes that unions will sit idly by and let union firms whittle away any union 
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wage differential by hiring better-quality workers. I would argue that it is more likely 
that unions would respond to better-quality workers by raising wages even more. 
Employers, anticipating this, may respond by hiring lower quality workers" (Wes­
sels 1994, p. 616). In Wessels' formal model, union employers will hire lower 
(higher) skill workers if labor quality augments capital productivity and the elasticity 
of substitution between labor and capital is less than (greater than) unity.2 
Skill homogeneity in union workplaces can result for (at least) three reasons. First, 
homogeneity may result from union wage standardization policies and subsequent 
selection by employers and employees. Unions narrow wage differences across high­
and low-skill job categories and decrease dispersion within job categories through 
reliance on contractually determined wages based on job position and seniority, 
rather than on individual, merit-based wage setting (Freeman 1980, 1982). In re­
sponse to such wage standardization, employer and employee selection will lead to 
unmeasured union-nonunion skills being negatively related to measured skill levels. 
To make the point clear, assume unionized firms pay a single wage to all workers 
and that schooling represents a premarket attribute measuring worker skill with error. 
As workers queue for union jobs, there will be a long queue among less-schooled 
workers, for whom the union wage represents a large premium, and a short queue 
among highly educated workers, for whom alternative wages tend to be high. Among 
the low-schooling group few workers would reject the high-paying union job, but 
employers will reject the less-able applicants in the queue. Employer selection, there­
fore, leads to high levels of unmeasured skills among those with low credentials. 
Among highly educated workers, the most productive workers will not be in the 
queue owing to higher alternative wages, leading to low levels of unmeasured ability 
among those with high measured skills.3 Selection leads to a predictable bias in 
estimates of union wage effects. Estimates from wage level regressions among work­
ers with low measured skills are likely to be biased upward owing to positive selec­
tion on ability. Estimates among workers with high measured skills are likely to 
be biased downward owing to lower unmeasured skill among union than nonunion 
workers. The standard conclusion that the union premium is higher for low-skill 
than for high-skill workers may be overstated or no longer hold once one nets out 
the effects of unmeasured skills. 
A second explanation for skill homogeneity emphasizes the effect of dispersion 
on the likelihood of unionization, rather than the other way around. Unions are most 
likely to organize and maintain political support in establishments where worker 
preferences and skills are relatively homogeneous (Farber and Saks 1980; Hirsch 
1982; and Demsetz 1993). True skills are likely to be more homogeneous than are 
measured skills. 
A third explanation for skill homogeneity within union workplaces deemphasizes 
union goals and wage standardization and instead focuses on the employer response 
to a union tax on wages. As shown by Wessels (1994), depending on the nature of 
2. Intuitively, there is little incentive for employers to upgrade skills if it leads to future wage increases 
and production technology is such that high-ability workers have a small impact on productivity owing, 
for example, to a highly routinized production process. 
3. Abowd and Farber (1982) and Card (1996) provide two-sided selection models whereby being a union 
member requires a worker to desire covered employment and to be chosen by the employer from the union 
queue. 
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technology and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, higher union 
wages need not lead to skill upgrading. If labor quality augments capital and the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor decreases with measured skill 
level (for such evidence, see Hamermesh 1986), the Wessels model predicts a more 
compressed distribution of skills in union workplaces. For example, an elasticity of 
substitution greater than unity for high school graduates and less than unity for col­
lege graduates would lead the firm to hire relatively high ability high school gradu­
ates and low ability college graduates in response to a union wage increase.4 Skill 
homogeneity can result, therefore, from a uniform union tax on wages, absent any 
attempt at wage standardization. As before, union-nonunion differences in unmeas­
ured ability decline with the level of measured skill. Although standard wage level 
estimates of the premium may decline with respect to measured skill, ' ' true'' union 
wage effects would not vary with the level of skill. 
All three explanations for union skill homogeneity lead to the expectation of an 
inverse relationship between union-nonunion measured and unmeasured skills or, 
stated alternatively, greater compression in true skills than in measured skills. The 
finding that true union wage effects by skill class are more similar than standard wage 
level estimates is consistent, therefore, with any of these explanations. A finding of 
identical wage effects across skill groups appears most consistent with a variant of 
the Wessels model. A uniform union tax, however, need not be inconsistent with 
union contracts that standardize wages and lessen top-to-bottom wage differences 
within firms relative to what would exist in a nonunion workplace, as long as em­
ployer-employee sorting follows in response to such standardization. But uniform 
union wage effects are not consistent with a model in which unions both seek and 
acquire larger proportional gains to low-skill than to high-skill members, following 
labor market sorting. The union endogeneity explanation (namely, skill homogeneity 
increases unionization) may help account for relatively uniform union wage effects, 
but does require that union wage effects be equivalent across skill levels. 
Card (1996) has recently provided a careful examination of union wage effects 
and skills using longitudinal analysis from a 1987-88 CPS panel of male workers. 
Following adjustment for misclassification error of union status, based on informa­
tion in a January 1977 CPS validation survey, Card concludes that all-worker OLS 
wage level and longitudinal union-nonunion wage differential estimates are similar, 
and that there exists positive selection among workers with lower measured skill 
and negative selection among those with higher measured skill. Card continues to 
find that longitudinal union wage effects decline with skill level, although by less 
than do standard estimates not controlling for worker fixed effects. Card relies on 
a two-sided employer-employee selection model, as described previously, to explain 
these results. Our analysis differs from Card in several respects. We utilize substan­
tially larger and more recent data-CPS panels for 1989/90-1994/95. Instead of 
relying on a measurement error adjustment based on an external survey and assumed 
constant across skill grades, we make several sample restrictions that sharply reduce 
bias from measurement error and increase reliability of our estimates. In contrast to 
4. In the Wessels model, the value given to labor quality depends in part on its enhancement of capital 
productivity. If the elasticity of substitution is greater than (less than) unity, a union tax on labor increases 
(decreases) capital's share and increases (decreases) the weight given to labor quality. 
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Card, we conclude that union wage effects are highly similar across groups of work­
ers with high and low levels of measured skills, after accounting for unmeasured 
skills and following labor market sorting. We also present direct evidence from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) on union-nonunion differences in 
the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT)-a productivity-related worker attribute 
not measured in the CPS.5 
III. Model, Data, and the Use of Sample Restrictions 
to Reduce Measurement Error 
The relationship between skills and the union wage premium is ex­
amined by estimating log wage equations in levels and in difference form. The former 
provides conventional estimates of union premiums by skill category, while the latter 
purges premium estimates of bias owing to omitted worker-specific skills transfer­
able between union and nonunion jobs. As our measure of skill group, we follow 
Card (1996) and sort workers into skill categories based on their predicted wage, 
formed by estimating a wage level equation for nonunion workers with premarket 
personal and location variables (see footnote 10). All union and nonunion workers 
are then placed in one of four quartiles based on the log wage predicted from the 
equation.6 
Union wage effects are first estimated using standard wage level equations: 
(1) ln W;rs = Xjitsf3js + Union;rs8s + Yeary;rs'tys + r;s + e;, . 
Here ln Wits is the log real wage of worker i in year tin skill groups, vector X consists 
of variables (indexed by i) measuring personal and job-related characteristics, and 
J3 are the respective coefficients, Union is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker 
is a union member, e, is a measure of the union log wage differential by skill group 
s, and Year are year dummies (indexed by y). The error term is divided into an 
individual-specific "skill" component cris) assumed fixed over time (one year in 
our case), and a random, well-behaved component (e;, ). 
If the omitted fixed effect r is correlated with union status, then estimates of e 
are likely to be biased. For example, let r = a + D.Union + J.L. Using the standard 
measure of omitted variable bias (which assumes that r is uncorrelated with other 
variables in (1)), the OLS wage premium estimate 8' = e + Q, where e is the 
"true" union premium and Q is the skill bias. Further, if the correlation between 
Union and Care allowed to differ by skill category s such that e; = e, + Q., the 
magnitude and possibly direction of the bias will differ across measured skill catego­
ries. Or, as we subsequently show, standard estimates of e; decline with measured 
skilled level largely because n, is strongly positive for low-skill workers and small 
5. An earlier version of our paper (Hirsch and Schumacher 1996) was written independently of Card's 
study. For a related study using Canadian data, see Lemieux (1993). 
6. It is important to measure skill based on premarket characteristics rather than on labor market outcomes 
(for example, occupational attainment) that are positively correlated with the wage and unmeasured skills. 
In an earlier version of our paper (Hirsch and Schumacher 1996), we focused on education as a measure 
of skill. As shown subsequently, basic results are highly similar to those based on the predicted wage. 
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or negative for high-skill workers. True union wage effects e, may vary little across 
measured skill groups. 
Letting � represent changes between adjacent years, a wage change equation will 
take the form (dropping the individual subscript i): 
(2) � ln Wds = AXjds�js + �Uniond, es + Yeard,'t�, + �eds. 
Here d indexes the one-year time period over which changes occur and Yeard, repre­
sents dummies that measure differences in average wage growth. The fixed effect 
r falls out, potentially allowing unbiased estimates of e,. 
The data used in the paper are from the Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing 
Rotation Group (ORG) earnings files for January 1989 through May 1995. The struc­
ture of the CPS permits one to match given individuals in the same month, one year 
apart. We construct a large panel data set for 1989-90 through 1994-95 from the 
CPS ORG.7 Our sample consists of private-sector wage and salary workers, ages 16 
and over. Excluded are those who are not in private-sector wage and salary employ­
ment in consecutive years, workers whose primary activity is schooling in either 
year, those whose weekly earnings are top-coded by the Census (at $1,923) in either 
year (since measured wage change would then be determined by the earnings assign­
ment in the open-ended category), workers with an implied wage (weekly earnings 
divided by hours worked per week) less than $1 or more than $99.99 (the latter 
corresponds to someone receiving weekly earnings near the cap and working less 
than 20 hours), workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement who are not 
union members (covered nonmembers are more likely to have union status measured 
with error and have wages higher than nonunion workers but lower than union mem­
bers), workers whose earnings or union status have been allocated by the Census in 
either year (these two restrictions are examined below), and workers who cannot be 
matched across years. Because the Census reinterviews households in fixed locations, 
individuals whose household moves or who move out of a household during the 
year are not in the sample. Young workers are most likely to be underrepresented 
(Peracchi and Welch 1995; Card 1996). 
To insure comparability between the wage level and wage change samples, the 
panel data set is used for estimation of both Equations 1 and 2, with the levels 
equations based on second-year observations for each worker. Wage level estimates 
using the full CPS ORG data set are very similar. We include standard control vari­
ables in X-schooling, potential experience (the minimum of age - schooling - 6 
or age - 16) and its square, gender (separately and interacted with the experience 
variables), marital status (two dummies included), race and ethnicity identifiers (4), 
part-time status, region (8), metropolitan size (6), industry (12), occupation (11), 
and year (5). In the wage change equations, most of the variables in X are time 
invariant. Included in addition to changes in union status are changes in experience 
squared, part-time status, broad industry, and broad occupation, plus year dummies. 
By construction, region and city size do not change because households that move 
cannot be matched in the CPS panel. Experience changes by one for all and is cap-
7. Details on construction of the CPS panel are provided in Hirsch and Schumacher (1996), along with 
separate estimates by gender. The Census adopted new area samples after May 1995, not permitting the 
matching of households for June-December 1994-95. 
Hirsch and Schumacher 207 
tured in the intercept. Remaining variables either cannot change by construction of 
the panel (for example, gender) or are treated as invariant because recorded changes 
may result from measurement error (for example, schooling). 
Measurement error in the union variable presents a potentially serious problem 
for the longitudinal analysis. Mismeasured union status lowers the signal-to-noise 
ratio in /';.Union, biasing estimates of 8 toward 0. We reduce error resulting from 
the misclassification of union status through a series of sample restrictions. Although 
such restrictions reduce bias from measurement error, they do so at the cost of reduc­
ing the sample size and, to a lesser extent, representativeness. Such an approach is 
feasible using large CPS panels for multiple years, but is less so using a single year's 
CPS panel (as in Card 1996) or smaller data sets such as the PSID or NLSY. 
Table 1 presents wage level and longitudinal union premium estimates based on 
alternative groups of measured union switchers and using alternative sample restric­
tions. Results in lines 1a and lb are based on our primary sample (n = 153,778), 
using the restrictions stated above. The union premium estimate from the wage level 
equation is 0.18 log points. Our most important method for reducing measurement 
error bias in /';.Union is to distinguish (using interaction terms) between four types 
of reported union changers: workers who change both (three-digit) occupation and 
industry as well as union status, those who change industry but not occupation, those 
who change occupation but not industry, and those who change neither industry nor 
occupation. Our principal results focus on wage changes among the first group­
union switchers who also change detailed industry and occupation-because this 
group is least likely to include misclassified union switchers. Separate interaction 
terms are included to control for the other three groups of union switchers and for 
wage change associated with broad occupation and industry change, independent of 
union status change.8 
Our preferred longitudinal union premium estimate is 0.12 log points, based on the 
sample of industry-occupation changers (lines 1a and 2). By contrast, the estimated 
premium is 0.08 among workers reporting industry-only changes, 0.03 among occu­
pation-only changers, and 0.02 among those changing neither industry nor occupa­
tion. These results are consistent with known measurement problems in the CPS, 
which exaggerate the amount of year-to-year occupational and, to a lesser extent, 
industry switching (Polivka and Rothgeb 1993). A "standard" longitudinal estimate 
based on the pooled group of union switchers (line lb) is only 0.06, half the size 
of our preferred estimate. Basing longitudinal estimates on union status changers 
who also change industry and occupation appears to be a fruitful (and simple) strat­
egy for reducing measurement error bias. All longitudinal estimates presented subse­
quently are based on union switchers who change occupation and industry. 
We next examine alternative sample restrictions. The earliest year in our CPS data 
set is 1989, when the Census first included a flag for individuals whose union status 
is allocated. Our primary sample (line 2) omits workers whose union status is allo­
cated in either of the two years, as well as workers whose earnings are allocated by 
8. Wage change regressions including not only changes in broad occupation and industry, but also dum­
mies for whether workers change detailed industry/occupation, industry only, or occupation only, produced 
virtually identical results. In results not shown, wage level estimates of 0 are 0.19 among union members 
in year 2 who changed neither industry nor occupation, and 0.15-0.16 among union members who changed 
industry or occupation or both. 
Table 1 
Wage Level and Change Estimates of the Union Differential, Alternative Sample Restrictions 
Wage Level Wage Change 
Standard Standard 
n Union Error [#switch] A Union Error 
Alternative union switcher groups using primary sample 
la. Primary sample 153,778 0.182 (.0032) 153,778 
Union switchers - - - [6,622] 
Industry I occupation change - - - [1,805] 0.116 (.0081) 
Industry only change - - - [638] 0.082 (.0136) 
Occupation only change - - - [1,684] 0.031 (.0084) 
No industry/occupation change - - - [2,495] 0.024 (.0069) 
1 b. Primary sample with all union 153,778 0.182 (.0032) [6,622] 0.056 (.0042) 
switchers 
Alternative sample restrictions and industry/occupation union switcher estimates 
2. Primary sample 153,778 0.182 (.0032) 153,778 0.116 (.0081) 
3. Full sample 217,793 0.178 (.0027) 217,793 0.098 (.0068) 
4a. Union not allocated 213,922 0.182 (.0028) 209,792 0.115 (.0073) 
4b. Union allocated 3,871 0.103 (.0178) 8,001 0.008 (.0253) 
5a. Earnings not allocated 212,364 0.180 (.0028) 207,049 0.101 (.0069) 
5b. Earnings allocated 5,429 0.095 (.0190) 10,744 0.057 (.0338) 
6a. No proxy respondent 76,252 0.186 (.0048) 54,152 0.115 (.0149) 
6b. Proxy respondent 77,526 0.177 (.0043) 99,626 0.116 (.0098) 
The sample includes private-sector wage and salary workers ages 16 and over employed during consecutive years, from the CPS Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) 
earnings files for January 1989 through May 1995. Deleted are workers not matched across years, workers whose principal activity is schooling, covered nonmembers, 
workers with top-coded earnings, and workers with extreme wages or wage changes. The "primary sample" omits workers with allocated union status or allocated 
earnings, but includes workers with proxy respondents. Wage level equations are based on 1990-95; wage change equations 1989/90-1994/95. n is sample size and 
[# switch] is number of union switchers. In lines 2 through 6, union change coefficients are based on union switchers who change detailed occupation and industty. 
Separate interaction terms are included for other union switchers, as in line la. Other variables included in wage level regressions are schooling, potential experience 
(minimum of age - schooling - 6 or age - 16) and its square, gender (separately and interacted with the experience variables), marital status (two dummies included), 
race and ethnicity identifiers (4), part-time status, region (8), metropolitan size (6), industty (12), occupation (11), and year (5). The wage change equations include, in 
addition to the change in union status variables, change in experience squared, change in part-time status, change in industty, change in occupation, and year dummies. 
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the Census in either year.9 The importance of these sample restrictions is seen in 
Table 1. The "full" sample (line 3), which includes workers with allocated union 
status and earnings, produces a similar premium estimate in levels (0.18), but 0.02 
lower in changes (0.1 0 versus 0.12). Wage level estimates based either on the sample 
with union status allocated in the second year of the panel (line 4b) or those with 
earnings allocated in year two (line 5b) are each 0.1 0, substantially lower than the 
0.18 from the restricted or full samples. Longitudinal premium estimates are particu­
larly sensitive to mismeasured union status and earnings. The sample with union 
status allocated in either year (line 4b) has a coefficient on !:.Union of only 0.01, 
reflecting serious measurement error bias. The sample with a designation that earn­
ings were allocated in either year (line 5b) yields a !:.Union coefficient of only 0.06. 
In the latter case, measurement error is in the dependent variable, but 8 is biased 
downward because such error is not random. The Census "hot-deck" procedure 
often assigns earnings to union workers based on nonunion "donors" and to non­
union workers based on union "donors," biasing downward measured union-non­
union wage differences. 
An additional sample restriction issue examined is whether to include individuals 
in the CPS for whom information was provided by a "proxy" respondent (often a 
spouse). This issue is potentially important, since roughly half the responses in a 
given year are by proxy. Using panel analysis, an even greater proportion of the 
sample is based on proxy respondents in at least one of the two years. The good 
news is that estimates of union wage effects are highly similar for samples of workers 
who provided their own responses and samples with proxy respondents. Lines 6a 
and 6b of Table 1 divide our primary sample into ' 'no proxy'' and ' 'proxy'' samples. 
Wage level estimates of 8 are 0.19 and 0.18, respectively, while longitudinal esti­
mates of 8 are 0.12 in both cases. No distinction between workers with and without 
proxy respondents is made in the analysis that follows. 
IV. Union-Nonunion Wage Differentials by 
Measurable Skill Group 
Wage level and change equation estimates of union wage effects by 
skill level are provided in Table 2. Column 1 shows estimates of 8 from the full 
sample. The next four columns present separate estimates of 8 by skill group, mea­
sured alternatively by the predicted wage and schooling. Measured skill quartiles 
are formed from a predicted wage based on premarket wage correlates.10 The far 
9. Earnings allocation information is not provided in the ORG beginning in 1994. Hence, sample deletions 
from the 1993-94 sample are based only on allocation information for 1993, and no deletions are made 
from the January-May 1994-95 sample. Card (1996) deletes those with allocated earnings, but was not 
able to omit those witb allocated union status. 
10. The predicted wage is calculated from the coefficients of a wage equation including schooling, poten­
tial experience and its square, gender (separately and interacted with the experience variables), marital 
status, race and etbnicity identifiers, region, metropolitan area size, and year, estimated for the sample of 
all nonunion workers. Union and nonunion workers are tben divided into skill quartiles measured by their 
predicted log wage. Estimates of El, shown in Table 2 are obtained from wage equations estimated sepa­
rately by skill group. 
Table 2 
Wage Level and Change Estimates of the Union Differential, by Skill Category 
All First 
Base specification (with occupation dummies) 
la. Level (union) 0.182 0.223 
(.0032) (.0067) 
lb. Change (llunion) 0.116 0.104 
(.0081) (.0143) 
Specification (without occupation dummies) 
2a. Level (union) 0.131 0.203 
(.0033) (.0068) 
2b. Change (ilunion) 0.114 0.103 
(.0081) (.0144) 
Sample size 153,778 38,070 
Number of union industry/occupation changers 1,805 504 
Percent union industry I occupation to all changers 27.3 31.6 
Predicted Wage Quartile 
Second Third 
0.216 0.198 
(.0067) (.0057) 
0.113 0.143 
(.0158) (.0159) 
0.183 0.160 
(.0065) (.0058) 
0.109 0.142 
(.0158) (.0159) 
38,122 38,631 
456 472 
28.4 26.7 
Fourth 
0.130 
(.0070) 
0.104 
(.0195) 
0.043 
(.0070) 
0.098 
(.0195) 
38,955 
373 
22.5 
F [p-value] 
91.515 
[0 .000] 
0.001 
[0.976] 
258.925 
[0.000] 
0.036 
[0 .850] 
N 
,__. 
0 
� 
()< 
s:: 
8 
e:.. 
0 ..., 
g: 
s 
§ 
:::0 
(1) "' 
0 
s:: 
;:J 
(1) 
00 
Years Schooling 
High Some College 
All Dropouts School College Graduate F [p-value] 
Base specification (with occupation dummies) 
3a. Level (union) 0.182 0.237 0.198 0.168 0.084 113.805 
(.0032) (.0079) (.0042) (.0063) (.0119) [0.000] 
3b. Change (Aunion) 0.116 0.107 0.117 0.120 0.111 0.022 
(.0081) (.0191) (.0115) (.0159) (.0269) [0.883] 
Sample size 153,778 17,905 63,246 41,384 31,243 
Number of union industry/occupation changers 1,805 303 827 476 199 
Percent union industry/occupation to all changers 27.3 27.0 28.4 28.1 22.4 
See note to Table 1. The predicted wage quartiles are based on coefficients from a log wage equation estimated with the nonunion sample and variables measuring 
premarket skills, demographic characteristics, and location (see text for details). The base specification corresponds to that shown in Table 1, line 1. The F and p values 
correspond to the null that coefficients in the lowest and highest skill or schooling categories are equivalent. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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right column of Table 2 provides F-ratio and probability values corresponding to 
the null that es is equivalent in the low-and high-skill quartiles or schooling groups. 
The sample used in Table 2 corresponds to the "primary" sample from Table 1, 
with the longitudinal estimates of e based on workers changing industry and occupa­
tion as well as union status.11 
Cross-sectional union premium estimates decrease substantially with skill leveL 
In line 1a, estimates decline with respect to measured skills, with log differentials 
of 0.22, 0.22, 0.20, and 0.13 as we move from the lowest to highest skill quartile. 
The null of equivalent union premiums in the first and fourth quartiles is decisively 
rejected. The cross-sectional pattern is more readily evident when occupation dum­
mies are omitted (line 2a), with estimates of 0.20, 0.18, 0.16, and 0.04, respectively. 
Absent occupational controls, the wage level model includes relatively few direct 
measures of skilL Exclusion of occupation dummies not only lessens differences in 
estimated union premiums across skill classes, but also causes the average e to 
decrease substantially (from 0.18 to 0.13) because union workers are concentrated 
in production and laborer occupational categories with low average pay, while being 
underrepresented in professional and managerial occupations. Because wage regres­
sions with occupation dummies are standard in the literature, results in line 1a pro­
vide the more appropriate benchmark.12 Line 3a segments the sample not by the 
predicted wage but by schooling category-dropouts, high school graduates, some 
college, and college graduates. This produces a similar pattern with estimates of 
0.24, 0.20, 0.17, and 0.08, respectively, for the various schooling classes. 
In sharp contrast to wage level estimates of e, longitudinal estimates are highly 
similar across skill groups-0.10, 0.11, 0.14, and 0.10 moving across skill groups 
from the bottom to top quartiles (line 1b). One cannot reject the null of equality 
between the low- and high-skill categories (or, in results not shown, of equivalence 
among all skill groups). We obtain identical estimates from the specification without 
occupational change variables (line 2b). Using schooling as our measure of skill 
group, we obtain estimates of 0.11, 0.12, 0.12, and 0.11 as we move from low to 
high schooling (line 3b)Y 
Our finding of equivalent longitudinal or ''quality-adjusted'' union premiums 
across premarket skill groups differs from results in Card (1996). Card concludes 
that fixed-effects estimates, adjusted for union misclassification error, decline with 
measured skill, although (as in this study) the spread in union wage effects across 
skill groups is reduced substantially as one moves from OLS to a fixed-effects esti­
mator. Our results, based on a substantially larger CPS panel data set (1989/90-
1994/95 versus 1987-88), differ from Card's primarily owing to our focus on union 
11. An earlier version of the paper (Hirsch and Schumacher 1996) provides separate analysis for males 
and females. A similar pattem exists for each group. 
12. Card (1996) does not include occupation dummies in his analysis, and thus obtains wage level estimates 
similar to his longitudinal premium estimates. Absent control for occupation, we likewise obtain similar 
estimates using wage level and wage change analysis. Wage level specifications with less and more detailed 
occupational controls yield very similar results. We also examined occupational skill variables from the 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles measuring required verbal, numerical and spatial abilities. Following 
control for broad occupation, inclusion of DOT skill variables had little effect on union premium estimates. 
13. To conserve space, we do not present coefficients from wage change models with separate estimates 
for union joiners, union leavers, union stayers, and nonunion stayers. As does Card ( 1996), we find roughly 
symmetrical wage gains and losses for union joiners and leavers. 
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switchers who also change industry and occupation. Card's adjustment for measure­
ment error assumes a constant rate of misclassification across skill groups.14 Among 
all measured union switchers, however, a smaller percentage of high-skill than low­
skill workers report changing occupation and industry. For example, 22.5 percent 
of union switchers in the top wage quartile change industry and occupation, as com­
pared to 31.6 percent in the bottom quartile. If not changing industry and occupation 
is a good proxy for the likelihood of misclassification, then applying a common 
misclassification rate to all measured union switchers will bias downward estimates 
for high-skill relative to low-skill groups. 
A clear inference from our results is that unmeasured skills are high among union 
workers with low measured skills, and low among union workers with high measured 
skills, as compared to nonunion workers with similar measured characteristics. 
"True" quality-adjusted union wage effects vary little with respect to measured 
premarket skills. The conventional wisdom that union wage effects are substantially 
smaller for high-skill workers has little support once one accounts for worker-specific 
skills. As discussed earlier, skill homogeneity found in union workplaces is likely 
to derive from several sources. A dual selection process, along the lines modeled 
by Abowd and Farber (1982) and Card (1996, pp. 977-78) will produce such a 
pattern. Given a union premium and the compression of wage differences within 
union workplaces, employers hire only the most able among workers with low mea­
sured skills, while more able workers with high measured skills are unlikely to be 
in the union queue. By this scenario, it is union wage-leveling policies that lead 
to a compression in the union ability distribution. An alternative explanation, also 
consistent with our evidence, relies on the model provided by Wessels (1994), which 
shows that employer response to a uniform union tax on labor may lead to compres­
sion in the distribution of worker ability. This explanation for skill homogeneity 
emphasizes the role of employers given a uniform union tax, absent union compres­
sion of the wage distribution. It is worth emphasizing that the findings here are 
conditional on labor market sorting that has taken place in response to unionization. 
It does not follow that a randomly selected college graduate would receive as high 
a union premium, or a randomly selected high school dropout as low a premium, 
as reflected in the longitudinal estimates. These estimates reflect the union premium 
observed for given workers switching into or out of union jobs. Such a focus is 
appropriate, since we are most interested in union wage effects among actual or 
potential covered workers and not among workers who are unlikely to select or be 
selected for union employment. 
V. Union Status and Skills: Evidence from the NLSY 
In this section, we turn to the NLSY for additional evidence on union 
status and skills. The AFQT, a widely used measure of individual aptitude, was 
administered to the NLSY sample in 1981 (and renormed in 1989), with individuals 
14. Card (1996) has large standard errors owing to use of a single CPS panel. He notes that identical 
rates of misclassification will produce greater bias among groups with the lowest rate of measured union 
transitions. 
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Table 3 
Mean AFQT Scores and Union-Nonunion AFQT Differentials 
Predicted Wage Education 
All 
Below 
Median 
Above 
Median 
School 
:S12 
Panel A: AFQT mean percentile scores by skill category and union status 
Union 
Weighted mean 
Standard deviation 
n 
Nonunion 
Weighted mean 
Standard deviation 
n 
All 
40.50 
25.80 
765 
51.66 
28.66 
4,112 
29.45 
22.37 
394 
34.01 
23.56 
2,044 
48.17 
25.23 
371 
63.27 
25.63 
2,068 
35.10 
23.49 
534 
35.99 
23.70 
2,282 
Weighted mean 50.09 33.36 61.20 35.83 
Standard deviation 28.54 23.45 26.09 23.66 
n 4,877 2,438 2,439 2,816 
Panel B: WLS regression union-nonunion AFQT differential, by skill class 
School 
>12 
53.75 
26.42 
231 
67.84 
23.97 
1,830 
66.61 
24.51 
2,061 
Union coefficient -9.230 -1.511 -13.316 -0.422 -9.699 
Standard error 1.089 1.243 1.482 1.066 1.726 
n 4,877 2,438 2,439 2,816 2,061 
AFQT is measured in percentiles. All means and regression results use NLSY sample weights. The pre­
dicted wage is determined by coefficients from a log wage equation estimated with the nonunion sample 
and variables measuring premarket skills, demographic characteristics, and location (see text for details). 
Regressions in Panel B also include dummies for age, gender, race, and ethnicity. 
ranging in age from 16 to 24 when tested. The AFQT represents the average of four 
tests included in the broader Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, and is 
expressed as a percentile score. Our AFQT sample includes 4,877 private-sector 
wage and salary workers employed in 1991, ages 26 to 34. 
The AFQT measure is useful in at least two ways. First, AFQT scores should be 
positively correlated with skills that are unmeasured in the CPS. If our interpretation 
of the CPS evidence is correct, then we should observe a decrease in relative union­
to-nonunion AFQT scores as we move from workers with low to high skills. Second, 
AFQT provides an alternative measure of worker premarket skills. Thus, segmenting 
workers on the basis of low and high aptitude scores should produce a pattern of 
wage level and wage change union premium estimates similar to those produced 
when we segment on the basis of other premarket skills. 
Table 3 presents means and regression results measuring union-nonunion differ­
ences in the AFQT. Because the NLSY oversamples minorities, all means and regres­
sion results are weighted using NLSY sample weights. In order to insure adequate 
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sample sizes of union and nonunion workers, we divide the sample into only two 
skill groups based, alternatively, on the median of the predicted wage, schooling 
(workers with a high school diploma or less and those with at least some college), 
and the median of AFQT scores. 
The full sample weighted mean of AFQT is the 50.1 percentile. Segmenting on 
the predicted wage we obtain a lower-half mean of 33.4 and upper-half mean of 
61.2, while we obtain means of 35.8 and 66.6 based on low and high levels of 
schooling, respectively. Similar AFQT scores are found among lower-skill union 
and nonunion workers (union status is measured by collective bargaining coverage), 
with AFQT about 4 points lower among union workers when the division is based 
on predicted wages and 1 point lower when based on schooling. In sharp contrast, 
among higher-skilled workers (measured by predicted wages or schooling), union 
workers score an average 14-15 points lower than do nonunion workers. Panel B 
of Table 3 presents the coefficient on union status from weighted least squares (WLS) 
regressions with individual AFQT scores as the dependent variableY Union-non­
union differences in AFQT are consistent with the means presented above. For the 
lower-skill groups of workers, union coefficients are close to 0 and insignificant. 
But among those with high predicted wages (schooling), AFQT scores are 13.3 (9.7) 
percentile points lower among union than nonunion workers. 
Assuming that AFQT is positively correlated with the unmeasured skills con­
trolled for in CPS wage change equations, the AFQT evidence supports our hypothe­
sis that relative union-nonunion unmeasured skills are inversely related to measured 
skills. That being said, AFQT scores do not capture all or even most unmeasured 
characteristics valued in the labor market, in particular such attributes as skills ac­
quired on the job, worker motivation, and personality.16 The similarity in AFQT 
scores among less-skilled union and nonunion workers, coupled with evidence from 
this group of a sharp drop in union premium estimates as one moves from wage 
level to longitudinal analysis, suggests that there are important worker-specific skills 
correlated with union status but measured by neither standard CPS variables nor the 
AFQT. 
We next provide evidence from the NLSY, analogous to that from the CPS, on 
differences in the union premium by skill group. The NLSY has disadvantages rela­
tive to the CPS-it includes a limited age range, and sample sizes of union changers 
are very small. Hence, we regard evidence from the NLSY as secondary to our 
primary evidence from the CPS. The NLSY has advantages, however. First, the 
AFQT aptitude score provides an alternative measure of worker-specific premarket 
skills, one that is not directly measured in the CPS. Second, the NLSY panel retains 
15. Control variables included are dummies for age in 1981 when the test was administered (AFQT scores 
increase with age), gender, race, and Hispanic status. Similar union-nonunion differences are found when 
the sample is segmented by gender or race. 
16. Wage level estimates of the union premium by skill group are affected little by the addition of AFQT 
to the wage equation. This suggests that aptitude scores reflect relatively few of the relevant unmeasured 
skills in wage level analysis. Cawley et al. (1996) provide evidence that AFQT and other aptitude measures 
are more weakly related to earnings and occupational choice than are schooling and family background 
measures. Neal and Johnson (1996), however, show that AFQT provides a good measure of black-white 
differences in premarket skills (not conditional on schooling or other variables), accounting for much of 
the racial wage gap subsequently observed in the labor market. 
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workers who have changed households and/or moved geographically. And third, 
measurement error in the union change vadable may be reduced by extending the 
change period beyond one year (thus increasing the ratio of signal to noise) and by 
measuring wage changes among those who change union status and who record 
at least one job change during the period. This strategy provides a way to reduce 
measurement error in the union change variable without requiring that occupation 
and industry also change. 
Table 4 presents union coefficients from NLSY wage level and change equations, 
with the sample segmented on the basis of predicted wages, schooling, and AFQT. 
The NLSY specification follows closely that used in the CPS analysis. The principal 
difference, besides the union variable, is that the wage change equations span a 
longer time interval (1989-91) and include dummy variables measuring changes in 
employer, region, and residence in a metropolitan area. Union status is measured 
by collective bargaining coverage, while the change in union status is equal to flUni­
on*Chgjob, where Chgjob equals 1 if the individual has changed employers over 
the period (separate control variables are included for Chgjob and flUnion*( 1 -
Chgjob)). 
Using the full sample with private-sector earnings in both years (including 130 
workers without an AFQT score), the union premium from the levels equation is 
0.13, while that from the change equation is 0.08. Although similar qualitatively, 
NLSY premium estimates are lower than the full-sample CPS estimates of 0.18 and 
0.12 from levels and change equations, respectively. When we segment the sample 
based on the predicted wage (the 1-45 and 55-99 percentiles), wage level estimates 
are 0.13 and 0.15 for the low- and high-skill groups, while longitudinal estimates 
are 0.05 and 0.08, respectively. Standard errors are large, with no differences close 
to statistical significance. When the sample is segmented by schooling group, wage 
level estimates are 0.18 and 0.02 for the groups with low and high schooling, respec­
tively, while the corresponding longitudinal estimates are 0.06 and 0.11. 
Finally, we segment workers based on low or high age-adjusted AFQT scores, 
measured by the residual from a WLS regression of the AFQT percentile score on 
a full set of age dummies.17 Among workers with both low and high AFQT scores, 
the wage level premium estimate is 0.15. Longitudinal estimates, however, are 0.07 
and 0.17 for the low- and high-ability groups, respectively. The (admittedly impre­
cise) NLSY results based on segmentation by predicted wages, schooling, and AFQT 
strongly reinforce our conclusions regarding the inverse relationship between relative 
union-nonunion measured and unmeasured skills. 
17. A value of 0 indicates a score equal to the mean of one's age group. The low and high AFQT groups 
have scores at least 5 percentile points below and above the mean for their age group, respectively. The 
larger sample size for the low AFQT group reflects the NLSY oversampling of minorities and disadvan­
taged youth. The AFQT is not directly observable to employers. If AFQT reflects some productivity-related 
skills visible to employers, wages will vary accordingly. Hence, wage level and change estimates based 
on segmentation by AFQT should be similar to those based on segmentation by predicted wages and 
schooling. Hirsch and Schumacher (1996) examine blue-collar/white-collar differences in the union 
premium. 
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Table 4 
Wage Level and Change Estimates of Union Differential, by Predicted Wage, 
Schooling, and AFQT Categories 
Panel A: Predicted Wage Category 
Low High 
All Skill Skill F [p-value] 
Level 0.130 0.129 0.154 0.288 
(0.022) (0.030) (0.034) [0.591) 
Change 0.077 0.048 0.084 0.269 
(0.032) (0.042) (0.054) [0.604) 
Sample size 3,775 1,676 1,726 
Number of changers 241 131 86 
Panel B: Schooling Category 
School School 
All :S12 >12 F [p-value] 
Level 0.130 0.178 0.022 10.426 
(0.022) (0.026) (0.041) [0.001] 
Change 0.077 0.060 0.106 0.433 
(0.032) (0.039) (0.060) [0.511] 
Sample size 3,775 2,223 1,552 
Number of changers 241 174 67 
Panel C: AFQT Category 
Low High 
All AFQT AFQT F [p-value] 
Level 0.125 0.147 0.146 0.000 
(0.022) (0.025) (0.047) [0.989) 
Change 0.086 0.070 0.173 1.842 
(0.033) (0.037) (0.073) [0.175] 
Sample size 3,645 2,052 1,232 
Number of changers 232 173 43 
Shown are coefficients (standard errors) on a union dummy variable in the level equations and the change 
in union status in the change equations. The F and p values correspond to the null that coefficients in the 
"low" and "high" categories are equivalent. NLSY wage level equations are estimated for 1991, while 
change equations measure changes between 1989 and 199 1. All NLSY results are from weighted least 
squares regression, using NLSY sample weights. The NLSY sample is composed of workers employed 
in the private sector in both 1989 and 1991. The levels specification is highly similar to that used with 
the CPS (see Table 1 note and text). In the NLSY change equation, the union status variable is !!.Union 
* Chgjob. Additional variables included are changes in union status for those who do not change jobs, a 
change job dummy, and changes in experience squared, part-time status, metropolitan residence, region, 
industry, and occupation. "Low Skill" and "High Skill" categories in Panel A include workers in this 
sample with predicted wages in the 1-45 and 55-99 percentiles, respectively, of the prediction wage 
sample. "Low AFQT" and "High AFQT" categories in Panel C include persons with AFQT scores at 
least 5 percentile points below or 5 points above the mean for their age group, respectively. 
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VI. Conclusions 
A universal finding in the empirical literature is that union wage ef­
fects are highest for workers with low levels of measured skills, and lowest among 
workers with high measured skills. In contrast to estimates from wage level regres­
sions, our longitudinal estimates using CPS panel data are very similar across groups 
of workers with different measured levels of premarket skills. The clear inference 
is that there exists positive sorting among workers with low measured skills and 
negative sorting among those with high measured skills, leading to substantial skill 
homogeneity in union workforces. Direct evidence from the NLSY on AFQT scores 
confirm that as measured skills increase, aptitude scores decrease for union relative 
to nonunion workers. Longitudinal estimates are shown to be sensitive to sample 
selection criteria and the designation of ' 'true'' union switchers. Deleting workers 
with allocated union status and earnings, and basing union premium estimates on 
reported union switchers who also change industry and occupation, provide what 
we believe is a reliable strategy to reduce what is otherwise considerable measure­
ment error bias in longitudinal premium estimates. 
Our analysis does not identify the specific routes through which skill compression 
within union workplaces is realized. Skill homogeneity results in part from sorting 
that occurs in response to union wage standardization policies that decrease earnings 
differences across and within job categories. Employer selection truncates the bottom 
tail of the skill distribution, while employee sorting results in there being relatively 
few high-skill workers in the union queue. Low dispersion in skills is also likely to 
reflect union success in organizing establishments where worker preferences and 
skills are relatively similar. A compressed distribution of skills and equivalent union 
wage effects across skill levels can also be explained by a variant of a model pro­
posed by Wessels (1994), wherein a uniform union tax on wages may lead to an 
upgrading of ability among lower-skill workers but not among higher-skill workers. 
Our results cast doubt on the thesis that unions both seek and acquire larger propor­
tional wage gains for low-skill than for high-skill members. Once labor market sort­
ing has occurred, union wage premiums are highly similar for workers with different 
levels of skills. 
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